Tim Kane thinks the U.S. military produces great leaders but then paralyzes them with its bureaucracy.
A product of the military system himself, Kane graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy and worked as an air force intelligence officer during two tours of duty in Asia. He also earned a Ph.D. in economics at U.C. San Diego and is now the chief economist at the conservative Hudson Institute. In his new book, Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why it’s Time for a Revolution, he argues that the military should get rid of its inefficient, lockstep promotion bureaucracy and replace it with a more entrepreneurial structure. Under the current system, some of the most talented officers resign in frustration because, he writes, “the military personnel system—every aspect of it—is nearly blind to merit.”
The root of the problem, he says, is a 1980 law called the Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act, or DOPMA, which lays out exactly how
leaders in all the services should be promoted. The law includes a
progression track with strict rules and timetables. Compensation has
nothing to do with merit, assignments have little to do with officers’
abilities and evaluations fail to give useful feedback or skills
assessments. He describes officers always being promoted from second to
first lieutenant and from lieutenant to captain, and often to major, no
questions asked. “One would have to commit a felony or two to hinder his
or her chances for promotion,” he writes.
There are also strict seniority rules for promotion to higher office like colonel or general, which require 20 years and 22 years, respectively. Then after just two years at the rank of general, an officer can retire with a full pension. The military never allows “lateral entry” from outside its forces, even among former officers who have taken time away from the service. If enlistees show extraordinary leadership potential, they must still abide by the lockstep timetable.
Kane believes this system stifles and ultimately chases away the most talented. Officially there are performance evaluations within the military, but in practice they tend to give high marks to mediocre performers, he writes. It’s also very tough to specialize within the system, since officers are matched with open positions using those empty performance evaluations, from a central human resources office in Fort Knox, Kentucky.
Kane wants to chuck this entire bureaucracy and replace it with a system that is much closer to the civilian world of promotions and assignments. The military should get rid of its strict seniority rules, making it possible for talented young officers to apply for challenging senior posts. There is nothing wrong, he says, with a colonel of 31 supervising a major who is 42.
The service should also open the officer ranks to lateral hires, including enlistees who show talent and former officers who may have done a stint in the private sector. He favors greater specialization and the option to remain a captain or a major for a longer period than the lockstep system allows. Many officers leave the service because they don’t want to give up commanding troops to hold a higher rank. Commanders, instead of the military’s central HR office, should have the power and authority to fill open slots, he says. The military should also make it easier to lay off officers who are performing poorly. He wants evaluations to be more meaningful and to weed out poor performers.
Kane also floats a couple of suggestions that go beyond hiring and promotion. He suggests that former soldiers could to use GI Bill money as start-up loans instead of for education. Though he acknowledges this could prompt more people to leave the military, he believes that, coupled with a policy that lets officers re-enter the service, it could foster outstanding skill building.
Though Kane makes many compelling points in the book, it’s tough to imagine his vision becoming reality. He does not favor incremental reform. A centralized bureaucracy can never work well, he insists. The system is broken, he maintains, and should be completely overhauled. But in his last chapter, Kane admits that the reality is that “the Pentagon bureaucracy will outlast memories of me and this book.” Still, he provokes a useful discussion and exposes some entrenched problems in the military’s system for managing leaders.
A product of the military system himself, Kane graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy and worked as an air force intelligence officer during two tours of duty in Asia. He also earned a Ph.D. in economics at U.C. San Diego and is now the chief economist at the conservative Hudson Institute. In his new book, Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why it’s Time for a Revolution, he argues that the military should get rid of its inefficient, lockstep promotion bureaucracy and replace it with a more entrepreneurial structure. Under the current system, some of the most talented officers resign in frustration because, he writes, “the military personnel system—every aspect of it—is nearly blind to merit.”
There are also strict seniority rules for promotion to higher office like colonel or general, which require 20 years and 22 years, respectively. Then after just two years at the rank of general, an officer can retire with a full pension. The military never allows “lateral entry” from outside its forces, even among former officers who have taken time away from the service. If enlistees show extraordinary leadership potential, they must still abide by the lockstep timetable.
Kane believes this system stifles and ultimately chases away the most talented. Officially there are performance evaluations within the military, but in practice they tend to give high marks to mediocre performers, he writes. It’s also very tough to specialize within the system, since officers are matched with open positions using those empty performance evaluations, from a central human resources office in Fort Knox, Kentucky.
Kane wants to chuck this entire bureaucracy and replace it with a system that is much closer to the civilian world of promotions and assignments. The military should get rid of its strict seniority rules, making it possible for talented young officers to apply for challenging senior posts. There is nothing wrong, he says, with a colonel of 31 supervising a major who is 42.
The service should also open the officer ranks to lateral hires, including enlistees who show talent and former officers who may have done a stint in the private sector. He favors greater specialization and the option to remain a captain or a major for a longer period than the lockstep system allows. Many officers leave the service because they don’t want to give up commanding troops to hold a higher rank. Commanders, instead of the military’s central HR office, should have the power and authority to fill open slots, he says. The military should also make it easier to lay off officers who are performing poorly. He wants evaluations to be more meaningful and to weed out poor performers.
Kane also floats a couple of suggestions that go beyond hiring and promotion. He suggests that former soldiers could to use GI Bill money as start-up loans instead of for education. Though he acknowledges this could prompt more people to leave the military, he believes that, coupled with a policy that lets officers re-enter the service, it could foster outstanding skill building.
Though Kane makes many compelling points in the book, it’s tough to imagine his vision becoming reality. He does not favor incremental reform. A centralized bureaucracy can never work well, he insists. The system is broken, he maintains, and should be completely overhauled. But in his last chapter, Kane admits that the reality is that “the Pentagon bureaucracy will outlast memories of me and this book.” Still, he provokes a useful discussion and exposes some entrenched problems in the military’s system for managing leaders.
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